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We examine the empirical properties of the payoffs to two popular currency speculation strategies:
the carry trade and momentum. We review three possible explanations for the apparent profitability
of these strategies. The first is that speculators are being compensated for bearing risk. The second
is that these strategies are vulnerable to rare disasters or peso problems. The third is that there is price
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In this survey we examine the empirical properties of the payo!st ot w oc u r r e n c ys p e c u l a t i o n
strategies: the carry trade and momentum. We then assess the plausibility of the theories
proposed in the literature to explain the proﬁtability of these strategies.
The carry trade consists of borrowing low-interest-rate currencies and lending high-
interest-rate currencies. The momentum strategy consists of going long (short) on currencies
for which long positions have yielded positive (negative) returns in the recent past.
The carry trade, one of the oldest and most popular currency speculation strategies, is
motivated by the failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP) documented by Bilson (1981)
and Fama (1984).1 This strategy has received a great deal of attention in the academic
literature as researchers struggle to explain its apparent proﬁtability. Papers that study this
strategy include Lustig & Verdelhan (2007), Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Jordà & Taylor
(2009), Farhi et al. (2009), Lustig et al. (2009), Ra!erty (2010), Burnside et al. (2011), and
Menkho! et al. (2011a).
In related work, a number of authors have studied the properties of currency momentum
strategies. These authors include Okunev and White (2003), Lustig et al. (2009), Menkho!
et al. (2011a, 2011b), Moskowitz et al. (2010), Ra!erty (2010), and Asness et al. (2009).
We begin by addressing the question: is the proﬁtability of the carry trade and momentum
strategies just compensation for risk, at least as conventionally measured? After reviewing
the empirical evidence we conclude that the answer is no. This conclusion rests on the fact
that the covariance between the payo!st ot h e s et w os t r a t e g i e sa n dc o n v e n t i o n a lr i s kf a c t o r s
is not statistically signiﬁcant.2
The di"culty in explaining the proﬁtability of the carry trade with conventional risk
factors has led researchers such as Lustig et al. (2009) and Menkho! et al. (2011a) to
1See Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) for surveys of the literature on uncovered interest parity.
2This ﬁnding is consistent with work documenting that one can reject consumption-based asset pricing
models using data on forward exchange rates. See, e.g. Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) and Backus, Foresi, and
Telmer (2001)).
1construct empirical risk factors speciﬁcally designed to price the average payo!st op o r t f o l i o s
of carry trade strategies. One natural question is whether these risk factors explain the
proﬁtability of the momentum strategy. We ﬁnd that they do not.
An alternative explanation for the proﬁtability of our two strategies is that it reﬂects the
presence of rare disasters or peso problem explanations. We argue, on empirical grounds,
that the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis cannot be used as an example of the kind of rare disaster that
rationalizes the proﬁtability of currency trading. The reason is simple: momentum made
money during the ﬁnancial crisis.
We then consider the literature that uses currency options data to characterize the nature
of the peso event that rationalizes the proﬁtability of carry and momentum. Based on this
analysis we argue that the peso event features moderate losses but a high value of the
stochastic discount factor (SDF).
Finally, we explore an alternative explanation for the proﬁtability of the carry trade and
momentum strategies. This alternative relies on the existence of price pressure in foreign
exchange markets. By price pressure we mean that the price at which investors can buy or sell
currencies depends on the quantity they wish to transact. Price pressure introduces a wedge
between marginal and average payo!st oat r a d i n gs t r a t e g y .A sar e s u l t ,o b s e r v e da v e r a g e
payo!sc a nb ep o s i t i v ee v e nt h o u g ht h em a r g i n a lt r a d ei sn o tp r o ﬁ t a b l e .S o ,t r a d e r sd on o t
increase their exposure to the strategy to the point where observed average risk-adjusted
payo!sa r ez e r o .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the empirical properties of
the payo!st ot h et w oc u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e st h a tw ec o n s i d e r . I nS e c t i o n3w ed i s c u s sr i s k -
based explanations for the proﬁtability of these strategies. Section 4 discusses the impact
on inference that results from rare disasters or peso problems. Section 5 provides a brief
discussion of the implications of price pressure. A ﬁnal section concludes.
22C u r r e n c y s t r a t e g i e s
In this section we describe the carry trade and currency momentum strategies.
The carry trade strategy This strategy consists of borrowing low-interest-rate currencies
and lending high-interest-rate currencies. Assume that the domestic currency is the U.S.
dollar (USD) and denote the USD risk-free rate by it.L e t t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e o n r i s k - f r e e
foreign denominated securities be i!
t.A b s t r a c t i n g f r o m t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s , t h e p a y o ! to








! (1 + it).( 1 )
Here St denotes the spot exchange rate expressed as USD per foreign currency unit (FCU).








An alternative way to implement the carry trade is to use forward contracts. We denote
by Ft the time-t forward exchange rate for contracts that mature at time t +1 ,e x p r e s s e d
as USD per FCU. A currency is said to be at a forward premium relative to the USD if Ft
exceeds St.T h ec a r r yt r a d ec a nb ei m p l e m e n t e db ys e l l i n gf o r w a r dc u r r e n c i e st h a ta r ea ta
forward premium and buying forward currencies that are at a forward discount. The time t
payo! to this strategy can be written as:
z
F
t+1 = sign(Ft ! St)(Ft ! St+1).( 3 )
It is easy to show that, when covered interest parity (CIP) holds, these two ways of
implementing the carry trade are equivalent in the sense that zC
t+1 and zF
t+1 are proportional.3
So, whenever one strategy makes positive proﬁts so does the other.
3Taking transactions costs into account, deviations from CIP are generally small and rare. See Taylor
(1987, 1989), Clinton (1988), and Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleschelski and Rebelo (2006). However, there
were signiﬁcant deviations from CIP in the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. These deviations are likely
to have resulted from liquidity issues and counterparty risk. See Mancini-Gri!oli and Ranaldo (2011) for a
discussion.
3The portfolio carry trade strategy that we consider combines all the individual carry
trades in an equally-weighted portfolio. The total value of the bet is normalized to one USD.
We refer to this strategy as the “carry trade portfolio.” It is the same as the equally-weighted
strategy studied by Burnside et al. (2011).
The momentum strategy This strategy involves selling (buying) a FCU forward if it
was proﬁtable to sell (buy) a FCU forward at time t ! !.F o l l o w i n g L u s t i g e t a l .( 2 0 0 9 ) ,
Menkho! et al. (2011a), Moskowitz et al. (2010), and Ra!erty (2010), we deﬁne momentum









We consider momentum trades conducted one currency at a time against the U.S. dollar.
We also consider a portfolio momentum strategy that combines all the individual momentum
trades in an equally-weighted portfolio with the total value of the bet being normalized to
one USD. We refer to this strategy as the “momentum portfolio.”4
2.1 The payo!st oc a r r ya n dm o m e n t u m
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the payo!st oo u rt w oc u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e si m p l e -
mented for 20 major currencies, over the sample period 1976-2010.5 In every case, the size
of the bet is normalized to one USD.
The carry trade strategy Consider, ﬁrst, the equally-weighted carry trade strategy. This
strategy has an average payo! of 4.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.1 percent, and
aS h a r p er a t i oo f0.89.I n c o m p a r i s o n ,t h e a v e r a g e e x c e s s r e t u r n t o t h e U . S . s t o c k m a r k e t
4The strategy we consider di!ers from some momentum strategies studied in the literature, which consist
of going long (short) on assets that have done relatively well (poorly) in the recent past, even if the return
to these assets was negative (positive). See Jegadeesh & Titman (1993), Carhart (1997), and Rouwenhorst
(1998) for a discussion of this cross-sectional momentum strategy in equity markets.
5See Burnside et al. (2011) for a description of our data sources.
4over the same period is 6.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 15.7 percent and a Sharpe
ratio of 0.41.
Consider, next, the average payo! to the individual carry trades. Averaged across the
20 currencies, this payo! is 4.6 percent with an average standard deviation of 11.3 percent.6
The corresponding Sharpe ratio is 0.42.T h eS h a r p er a t i oo ft h ee q u a l l y - w e i g h t e dc a r r yt r a d e
is more than twice as large. Consistent with Burnside et al. (2007, 2008), this di!erence is
entirely attributable to the gains of diversifying across currencies, which cuts volatility by
more than 50 percent.
The momentum strategy The equally-weighted momentum strategy is also highly prof-
itable, yielding an average payo! of 4.5 percent. These payo!sh a v eas t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no f
7.3 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.62.A g a i n ,t h e r ea r es u b s t a n t i a lr e t u r n st od i v e r s i f y i n g
across individual momentum strategies. The average payo! of individual momentum strate-
gies across the 20 currencies is equal to 4.9 percent. The corresponding average standard
deviation is 11.3 percent and the Sharpe ratio is 0.43.A ne q u a l l y - w e i g h t e dc o m b i n a t i o no f
the two currency strategies, which we call the “50-50 strategy”, has an average payo! of 4.5
percent, a standard deviation of 4.6 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.98.T h e h i g h S h a r p e
ratio of the combined strategy reﬂects the low correlation between the payo!st ot h et w o
strategies.
Figure 1 displays the cumulative returns to investing in the carry and momentum port-
folios, in the U.S. stock market, and in Treasury bills. Since the currency strategies involve
zero net investment we compute the cumulative payo!sa sf o l l o w s .W ei n i t i a l l yd e p o s i to n e
USD in a bank account that yields the same rate of return as the Treasury bill rate. In
the beginning of every period we bet the balance of the bank account on the strategy. At
the end of the period, payo!st ot h es t r a t e g ya r ed e p o s i t e di n t ot h eb a n ka c c o u n t .F i g u r e
1s h o w st h a tt h ec u m u l a t i v er e t u r n st ot h ec a r r ya n dm o m e n t u mp o r t f o l i o sa r ea l m o s ta s
6The average payo! across individual carry trades does not (to two digits) coincide with the average
payo! to the equally-weighted portfolio because not all currencies are available for the full sample.
5high as the cumulative return to investing in stocks. By the end of the sample the carry
trade, momentum, and stock portfolios are worth $30.09, $27.98,a n d$40.22,r e s p e c t i v e l y .
However, the cumulative returns to the stock market are much more volatile than those of
the currency portfolios. Also, note that most of the returns to holding stocks occur prior
to the year 2000. An investor holding the market portfolio from the end of August 2000
until December 2010 earned a cumulative return of only 14.9 percent. Investors in risk-free
assets, carry, and momentum earned cumulative returns of 26.7 percent, 93.9 percent, and
76.1 percent, respectively, over the same period.
The payo!st oc u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e sa r eo f t e nc h a r a c t e r i z e da sb e i n gh i g h l ys k e w e d( s e e
e.g. Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Our point estimates indicate that carry trade payo!sa r e
skewed, but this skewness is not statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, carry trade payo!s
are less skewed than the payo!st ot h eU . S .s t o c km a r k e t . T h ep a y o !st ot h em o m e n t u m
portfolio are actually positively skewed, though not signiﬁcantly so.
As far as fat tails are concerned, currency returns display excess kurtosis, with noticeable
central peakedness, especially in the case of the carry trade portfolio. It is not obvious, how-
ever, that investors would be deterred by this kurtosis, given the relatively small variance of
carry trade payo!s, when compared to that of the aggregate stock market. Indeed, Burnside
et al. (2006) use a simple portfolio allocation model to show that a hypothetical investor
with constant relative risk aversion preferences, and a risk aversion coe"cient of ﬁve, would
allocate three times as much of his portfolio to diversiﬁed carry trades as he would to U.S.
stocks.
2.2 Mechanical explanations for why these strategies work
In this section, we relate the observed proﬁtability of the carry trade and momentum strate-




The two strategies di!er only in the deﬁnition of ut.
6Consider, ﬁrst, the case in which agents are risk neutral about nominal payo!s. In this















! (1 + it)
$
=0 .( 6 )
This is the UIP condition. When this condition holds neither strategy generates positive





=0 ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,E(zL
t+1)=0 .
CIP and UIP, together, imply that the forward exchange rate is an unbiased forecaster of
the future spot exchange rate, i.e. Ft = Et(St+1).I th a sb e e nk n o w ns i n c eB i l s o n( 1 9 8 1 )a n d
Fama (1984) that forward-rate unbiasedness fails empirically. So, we should not be surprised
that both currency strategies yield non-zero average proﬁts. However, the two strategies
di!er subtly in how they exploit the fact that the forward is not an unbiased predictor of
the future spot.
To see why the carry trade has positive expected payo!sr e c a l lt h ec l a s s i cr e s u l to fM e e s e
&R o g o ! (1983) that the spot exchange rate is well approximated by a martingale:
EtSt+1 " = St.( 7 )






" " = |Ft ! St| > 0.
So, the carry trade makes positive average proﬁts as long as there is a di!erence between the
forward and spot rates, or, equivalently, an interest rate di!erential between the domestic
currency and the foreign currency.






t+1) = sign(St ! Ft)
&
=0 .571.
So, the probability that the carry trade is proﬁtable is 0.571.T h i sp r o ﬁ t a b i l i t yr e ﬂ e c t st h e
ability of the sign of the forward discount to predict the sign of the payo! to a long position
in foreign currency.
7The momentum strategy exploits the fact that, at least in sample, there is information
in the sign of zL











In the next section we turn to the question of whether risk-adjusting the UIP condition
can explain the payo!so ft h et w oc u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e s .
3R i s k a n d c u r r e n c y s t r a t e g i e s
In this section we argue that the average payo! to our two currency strategies cannot be
justiﬁed as compensation for exposure to conventional risk factors. We begin by outlining
the theory that underlies our estimation strategy. We then describe how we measure the
risk exposures of the two currency strategies. Finally, we discuss our empirical ﬁndings.
3.1 Theory
When agents are risk averse the payo!st ot h ec u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e sm u s ts a t i s f y :
Et (zt+1Mt+1)=0 .( 8 )
Here, Mt+1 denotes the SDF that prices payo!sd e n o m i n a t e di nd o l l a r s ,w h i l eEt is the
mathematical expectations operator given information available at time t.7
The unconditional version of equation (8) is:
E (Mz)=0 .( 9 )
This equation can be written as:
E (z)E(M)+c o v ( z,M)=0 .( 1 0 )
In practice, the average unconditional payo!st ot h es t r a t e g i e st h a tw ec o n s i d e ra r ep o s i t i v e .
The most straightforward explanation of this ﬁnding is that cov(z,M) < 0.
7Most of our analysis is conducted with nominal monthly payo!s. Two of our SDF models are based on
real risk factors that are measured at the quarterly frequency. When we work with these models, we follow
Burnside et al. (2011) in using quarterly compounded real excess returns to our two strategies.
8One can always rationalize the observed payo!st ot h e s es t r a t e g i e sb yu s i n gas t a t i s t i c a l
model to compute the risk premium as a residual. Consider, for example, the carry trade,
in which case we can write equation (8) as:
Ft ! St = Et (St+1 ! St)+pt.( 1 1 )
Here, pt is the risk premium which is given by:
pt =
covt (Mt+1,S t+1 ! St)
EtMt+1
.
Given a statistical model for Et (St+1 ! St),w ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n( 1 1 )t ob a c ko u tat i m e
series for pt and call that residual a “risk premium”:
pt = Ft ! St ! Et (St+1 ! St).
By construction, this risk premium can rationalize the payo!st ot h ec a r r yt r a d e .I ft h es p o t
exchange rate is a martingale, this procedure amounts to labeling the forward premium the
risk premium. While such an exercise can provide insights, we view the key challenge as
ﬁnding observable risk factors that are correlated with the payo!so ft h et w os t r a t e g i e s .




1 ! (ft ! µ)
" b
&
.( 1 2 )
Here " is a scalar, ft is a k # 1 vector of risk factors, µ = E(ft),a n db is a k # 1 vector of
parameters. We set " =1 ,b e c a u s e" is not identiﬁed by equation (9). Given this assumption
and the model for M given in equation (12), equation (9) can be rewritten as:
E (z)=c o v( z,f)b =c o v( z,f)!
#1
f · !fb = # · $,( 1 3 )
where !f is the covariance matrix of ft.T h eb e t a si ne q u a t i o n( 1 3 )a r ep o p u l a t i o nc o e "cients
in a regression of zt on ft and measure the exposure of the payo! to aggregate risk. The
k # 1 vector $ measures the risk premia associated with the risk factors.
93.2 Empirical strategy
We assess risk-based explanations of the returns to our currency strategies in two ways.
First, we ask whether there are risk factors for which the payo!st ot h es t r a t e g i e sh a v e
statistically signiﬁcant betas. These betas are estimated by running time-series regressions
of each portfolio’s excess return on a vector of candidate risk factors:
zit = ai + f
"
t#i + %it, t =1 ,...,T,f o re a c hi =1 ,...,n.( 1 4 )
Here T is the sample size, and n is the number of portfolios being studied. This step in our
analysis is similar in its approach, and in its conclusions, to Villanueva (2007).
Second, we determine whether GMM estimates of a candidate SDF can explain the
returns to the carry trade by testing whether equation (9), or, equivalently, equation (13),
holds for the estimated model. We estimate the parameters of the SDF, b and µ,u s i n gt h e
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Hansen 1982), and the moment restrictions (9) and





1 ! (f ! µ)
" b
&(
=0 ,( 1 5 )
where z is an n#1 vector of excess returns. The GMM estimators of µ and b are ˆ µ = ¯ f and






where dT is the sample covariance matrix of z with f,a n dWT is a weighting matrix.8
Estimates of $ are obtained from ˆ b as ˆ $ = ˆ !fˆ b,w h e r eˆ !f is the sample covariance matrix
of f.T h em o d e l ’ spredicted mean returns, ˆ z = dTˆ b,a r ee s t i m a t e so ft h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f
equation (13). The model R2 measures the ﬁt between ˆ z and ¯ z,t h es a m p l ea v e r a g eo ft h e
mean excess returns. The pricing errors are the residuals, ˆ & =¯ z ! ˆ z.W e t e s t t h a t t h e
pricing errors are zero using the statistic J = T ˆ &
"V
#1
T ˆ &,w h e r eVT is a consistent estimate
of the asymptotic covariance matrix of
$
T ˆ &.T h e a s y m p t o t i c d i s t r i b u t i o n o f J is '2 with
n ! k degrees of freedom.
8Burnside (2007) provides details of the GMM procedure.
10In the ﬁrst GMM step the weighting matrix is WT = In,a n dt h ee s t i m a t eo f$ and the
pricing errors are the same as the ones obtained by running a cross-sectional regression of
average portfolio excess returns on the estimated betas:
¯ zi = ˆ #
"
i$ + &i, i =1 ,...,n. (17)
Here ¯ zi = 1
T
)T
t=1 zit, ˆ #i is the OLS estimate of #i,a n d&i is the pricing error. In subsequent
GMM steps the weighting matrix is chosen optimally. Our results are similar at all stages
of GMM, so, due to space limitations, we only present results for iterated GMM.
3.3 Empirical results with conventional risk factors
In this section we use the empirical methods outlined in the previous section to determine
whether there is a candidate SDF that can price the returns to the carry trade and momen-
tum. We consider several models using monthly data: the CAPM (Sharpe 1964, Lintner
1965), the Fama & French (1993) three factor model, the quadratic CAPM (Harvey & Sid-
dique, 2000), and a model that uses the CAPM factor, realized stock market volatility, and
their interaction, as factors. The latter two models are ones in which the market betas of the
assets being studied can be thought of as being time varying. We also consider two models
using quarterly data. The ﬁrst model (the C-CAPM) uses the growth rate of real consump-
tion of nondurables and services as a single factor. This model is a linear approximation to a
representative agent model in which households have standard preferences over a single con-
sumption good. The second model (the extended C-CAPM) uses three factors: the growth
rate of real consumption of nondurables and services, the growth rate of the service ﬂow
from the real stock of durables, and the market return. This model is a linear approximation
to a representative agent model in which households have recursive preferences over the two
types of consumption good (see Yogo, 2006).
Table 2 summarizes the estimates we obtain by running the time-series regressions de-
scribed by equation (14) for monthly and quarterly models. In every case, but one, we ﬁnd
that the estimated betas are insigniﬁcantly di!erent from zero. The one exception is that
11the beta for the carry trade associated with the market return in the Fama-French three fac-
tor model is statistically signiﬁcant. However, this coe"cient is economically small (0.045).
Given our estimates of the Fama-French model, the implied annual expected return of the
carry trade portfolio should only be 0.3 percent. The actual return is 4.6 percent.
Table 3 presents estimates of the monthly models based on iterated GMM estimation.
Table 4 presents analogous results for the quarterly models. The models are estimated using
the equally-weighted carry trade and momentum portfolios, as well as Fama and French’s
25 portfolios sorted on the basis of book to market value and size. First, note that in every
case the pricing errors of the currency strategies are large and statistically signiﬁcant. So,
even though the models have some explanatory power for stocks, none of the models explains
currency strategies payo!s. Second, all of the models are rejected, at the 5 percent level, by
the pricing error test.
The only model with a reasonably good ﬁt (positive R2)i st h eF a m a - F r e n c hm o d e l .B u t
it, like the other models, does a very poor job of explaining the returns to the currency
portfolios. Figure 2 plots ˆ z,t h ep r e d i c t i o n so ft h eF a m a - F r e n c hm o d e lf o rE (zt),a g a i n s t
¯ z,t h es a m p l ea v e r a g eo fzt.T h e c i r c l e s p e r t a i n t o t h e F a m a - F r e n c h p o r t f o l i o s , t h e s t a r
pertains to the carry trade portfolio, and the square pertains to the momentum portfolio.
Not surprisingly, the model does a reasonably good job of pricing the excess returns to the
Fama-French 25 portfolios. However, the model greatly understates the average payo!st o
the currency strategies. The annualized average payo! to the carry trade and momentum
strategies are 4.6 and 4.5 percent, respectively. The Fama-French model predicts that these
average returns should equal 0.2 and !0.2 percent. The solid lines through the star and
square are two-standard-error bands for the di!erence between the data and model average
payo!,i . e .t h ep r i c i n ge r r o r .C l e a r l y ,w ec a nr e j e c tt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h em o d e la c c o u n t s
for the average payo!st ot h ec u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e s .
Overall, our results are consistent with those in Villanueva (2007), Burnside et al. (2011),
and Burnside (2011), who show that a wider set of conventional risk factors cannot explain
12the returns to the carry trade. Our results show that conventional risk factors also cannot
explain the returns to the currency momentum portfolio.
3.4 Factors derived from currency returns
We now turn to less traditional risk-factor models in which the factors are derived from the
returns to currency strategies. This approach, introduced to the currency literature by Lustig
et al. (2009), is similar to the one popularized by Fama & French (1993) who construct risk
factors based on the returns to particular stock strategies.
3.4.1 Portfolios of currencies sorted by their forward discount
Following Lustig & Verdelhan (2007), Lustig et al. (2009), and Menkho! et al. (2011a) we
construct ﬁve portfolios, labeled S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, by sorting currencies according to
their forward discount against the U.S. dollar (USD). The sorting is done period by period.
Each portfolio is equally weighted and represents the excess return to lending at the risk-free
rate the currencies included in the portfolio while borrowing USD at the risk free rate.
Table 5 shows that the average return to the portfolios S1-S5 is monotonically increasing.
This property is not surprising given Meese & Rogo!’s (1983) result that exchange rates are
close to a martingale. If the spot exchange rate for each currency was exactly a martingale,
then the conditional mean of each portfolio’s return would equal the average forward discount
of the constituent currencies. So, for a large enough sample, the sorting procedure would
generate portfolios with monotonically increasing average returns.
Consistent with the literature, we attempt to explain the cross-section of returns to these
portfolios of currencies, but we add the equally-weighted momentum portfolio to the set
of test assets.9 By focusing on currency portfolios and excluding stock returns from our
analysis, we allow for the possibility that markets are segmented, so that currency traders
and stock market investors have di!erent SDFs. That said, factors that explain portfolios
9We do not add the equally-weighted carry trade portfolio to the cross section because its construction
is closely related to that of the S1-S5 portfolios. However, we present betas for the equally-weighted carry
trade portfolio. Our cross-sectional results are robust to including this portfolio as one of the test assets.
13S1-S5 should also explain the currency momentum portfolio.
3.4.2 Currency-based risk factors
Like Lustig et al. (2009), we construct two risk factors directly from the sorted portfolios.
The ﬁrst risk factor, which they call the dollar risk factor and denote by DOL, is simply the
average excess return of the ﬁve sorted portfolios. The second risk factor, which they denote
by HMLFX,i st h er e t u r nd i !erential between the S5 portfolio (the largest forward discount)
and the S1 portfolio (the smallest forward discount). So, HMLFX is the payo! to a carry
trade strategy in which we go long in the highest forward-discount currencies and go short
in the smallest forward-discount currencies.
Following Menkho! et. al. (2011a), we construct a measure of global currency volatility,
which we denote by VOL. It is measured monthly, and is the average sample standard
deviation of the daily log changes in the values of the currencies in our sample against the
USD.
3.4.3 Betas of currency-based factors
Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating time-series regressions of the monthly excess
returns to S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, the carry trade portfolio and the momentum portfolio on two
pairs of risk factors: DOL and HMLFX,a n dD O La n dV O L .
The DOL and HMLFX factors are highly correlated with the S1—S5 portfolio returns. The
betas on the DOL factor are all close to one in value, and statistically signiﬁcant. The betas
of the HMLFX factor rise monotonically from !0.48 for S1 to 0.52 for S5. The betas for S2,
S3 and S4 are close to zero. While the R2 for the ﬁve regressions are large, this result is
not particularly surprising. Sorting portfolios on the basis of the forward discount produces
am o n o t o n i co r d e r i n go ft h ee x p e c t e dr e t u r n s .S o ,t h eD O La n dH M L FX factors create, by
construction, a pattern in the betas similar to that in Table 5.10 DOL and HMLFX also have
positive and signiﬁcant betas for the equally-weighted carry trade portfolio, but the R2 is
10See Burnside (2011) for a detailed discussion.
14much lower in this case. Finally, neither factor has a signiﬁcant beta for the momentum
portfolio.
Replacing HMLFX with VOL as a factor has very little impact on the betas with respect
to DOL. The betas with respect to VOL decrease monotonically as we go from S1 to S5
and are statistically signiﬁcant for the extreme portfolios, being positive for S1 and negative
for S5. These ﬁndings indicate that when global currency volatility increases, the returns
to holding low-interest rate currencies increase and the returns to holding high-interest rate
currencies decrease. That is, low interest rate currencies provide a hedge against increases
in volatility. The beta with respect to VOL is also negative and statistically signiﬁcant for
the carry trade portfolio. The beta with respect to VOL is positive but insigniﬁcant for the
currency momentum portfolio.
3.4.4 Cross-sectional analysis of currency-based risk factors
Table 6 presents iterated GMM estimates of the SDF for the two currency-based factor
models, using portfolios S1-S5 and the momentum portfolio as test assets. Figure 3 shows
the mean returns in the sample plotted against the model-predicted expected returns.
In both cases, the b parameter associated with the DOL factor is statistically insigniﬁcant.
The risk premium, $DOL,i sp o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁ c a n ti no n ec a s e . B u ti nn e i t h e rc a s ed o e s
exposure to DOL explain much of the variation in expected return across portfolios.
The b and $ parameters associated with the HMLFX factor are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The b and $ parameters associated with the VOL factor
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Neither the DOL-HMLFX model nor the DOL-VOL model do a good job of ﬁtting the
overall cross section of average payo!st ot h ec u r r e n c ys t r a t e g i e s .T h eR2 is lower than 0.04
for both models. The DOL-HMLFX model is rejected on the basis of the pricing-error test.
The DOL-VOL model is not rejected. But this apparent success is mostly due to the model’s
parameters being estimated with less precision than those of the HMLFX-based model.
The primary failing of both models is the large pricing error associated with momentum
15(approximately 5 percent). To understand this failing recall that the average payo! to
the momentum strategy is 4.5 percent. The DOL-HMLFX cannot explain this large payo!
because momentum’s beta is close to zero with respect to DOL and a negative with respect
to HMLFX.T h e D O L - V O L m o d e l d o e s n o b e t t e r b e c a u s e i t h a s a p a r a d o x i c a l l y p o s i t i v e
(but poorly estimated) beta with respect to VOL, i.e. momentum is a good hedge against
volatility. Menkho! et al. (2011a) ﬁnd a similar paradox using a set of sorted momentum
portfolios.
3.5 Concluding discussion
The results in this section suggest that observable risk factors explain very little of the average
returns to the carry trade and momentum portfolios, resulting in economically large pricing
errors. In every case the models can also be rejected based on statistical tests of the pricing
errors. Models built from currency speciﬁc factors do have some success in explaining the
returns to the carry trade. But, they do not explain the returns to the momentum portfolio.
4R a r e d i s a s t e r s a n d p e s o p r o b l e m s
Authors such as Jurek (2008), Farhi & Gabaix (2008), Farhi et al. (2009), and Burnside et
al. (2011) have argued that the payo!st ot h ec a r r yt r a d ec a n ,a tl e a s ti np a r t ,b ee x p l a i n e d
by the presence of rare disasters or peso problems.11 By rare disasters we mean very low
probability events that sharply decrease the payo! and/or sharply increase the value of the
SDF. These events may occur in sample. But, due to their low probability, they may be
under-represented relative to their true frequency in population. By a peso problem we mean
an extreme form of this problem, where rare disasters do not occur in sample.
11In this review we focus on recent work that uses options data to study the importance of rare disasters
and peso problems. See Evans (2011) for an excellent overview of the earlier literature that uses survey data
and regime-switching models to study how peso problems a!ect conditional inference about the behavior of
exchange rates.
16Rare disasters We study the e!ects of rare disasters on inference using a simple model.
Let ( % " denote the state of the world, let z(() denote the payo! to a currency strategy
in state (,a n dM(() denote the value of the SDF in state (.W e p a r t i t i o n ",t h es e to f
possible states, into two sets. The ﬁrst set, "N,c o n s i s t so ft h o s ev a l u e so f( corresponding
to non-rare-disaster (normal) events. The second set, "D,c o n s i s t so ft h o s ev a l u e so f(
corresponding to a rare-disaster event. For simplicity, we assume that "D contains a single
event, (D.W eu s et h en o t a t i o nM" = M((D) and z" = z((D),a n da s s u m et h a tz" < 0.T o
simplify, we assume that the conditional and unconditional probability of the rare disaster
is p.




" =0 ,( 1 8 )
where EN (·) denotes the expectation over normal states. Since the scale of M is not identiﬁed
for zero net investment strategies, we choose the normalization EN(M)=1 .
How can rare disasters explain the proﬁtability of a currency strategy? Assume, for
simplicity, that an econometrician can observe M and z and that the sample average of Mz
across normal events in the sample equals EN(Mz).S u p p o s et h a ti ns a m p l er a r ed i s a s t e r s
occur with frequency ˆ p<p .S i n c ez" < 0,t h eo v e r a l ls a m p l ea v e r a g eo fMz is positive, even
though the true unconditional value is zero:
(1 ! ˆ p)E
N (Mz)+ˆ pM
"z
" =( p ! ˆ p)
%
E




How likely are we to observe an unusually small number of rare disasters in sample?
Consider the value of p suggested by Nakamura et al. (2010). These authors deﬁne a rare
disaster as a large drop in consumption. Using data spanning 24 countries and more than
100 years, they estimate the annual probability of a disaster to be 0.017.T h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
monthly value of p is 0.0014.
Since most work on currency strategies focuses on the post Bretton-Woods era, we think
of a typical sample size as roughly (2011 ! 1973) # 12 = 456 months. For p =0 .0014,t h e
17expected number of events in a sample of this size is less than one. Indeed, the probability
of observing zero rare disasters in a sample of 456 months is roughly 53 percent.
Can we interpret particular in-sample events as realizations of the rare disaster event
that accounts for the observed proﬁtability of the carry trade and momentum strategies?
For example, was the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis an example of such a rare disaster? The answer is
no. To see why, note that equation (18) implies that the ratio of risk-adjusted mean payo!s








.( 1 9 )
Here, z"
1 and z"
2 denote the payo!st ot h ec a r r yt r a d ea n dm o m e n t u ms t r a t e g yi nt h ed i s a s t e r
state. We deﬁne the disaster period to be August—November 2008 because, during this
period, the carry trade su!ered a cumulative net loss of about 10 percent, its worst loss over
af o u rm o n t hp e r i o di no u rs a m p l e .I nc o n t r a s t ,t h em o m e n t u ms t r a t e g yh a dac u m u l a t i v e
gain of about 24 percent in this period, its largest over a four month period in our sample. So
the ratio on the right hand side of equation (19) is negative. Since the average risk-adjusted
proﬁts of both strategies are positive outside of the crisis period, the left hand side of equation
(19) is positive. So, the ﬁnancial crisis is not a plausible example of a rare-disaster event
that accounts for the proﬁtability of the carry trade and momentum strategies. Neither are
other periods in our sample (early 1991, and late 1992) when carry trades took heavy losses.
In these periods the momentum strategy was also highly proﬁtable.
There are two ways to avoid the conclusion that the recent ﬁnancial crisis is not the
type of rare disaster that accounts for the proﬁtability of the carry trade and momentum
strategies. The ﬁrst is to assume that, because of market segmentation, M" is di!erent for
the two currency trading strategies. This hypothesis seems very implausible. The second
is to assume that "D contains more than one event, and not all strategies earn negative
returns in all of these events. So the ﬁnancial crisis could be viewed as a rare disaster in
which the carry trade has a negative payo! but momentum does not. We cannot rule out
this explanation on logical grounds. But it leaves unexplained the in-sample proﬁtability of
18the momentum strategy.
Peso problems Recall that a peso problem corresponds to the case where there are no rare-
disasters in sample, so ˆ p =0 .A b s e n ta d d i t i o n a la s s u m p t i o n s ,t h ep e s o - p r o b l e me x p l a n a t i o n
of the proﬁtability of our two strategies has no testable implications, since z" is not observed.
To generate testable implications we assume, as above, that there is a single peso event. We
can then use data on currency options to develop a test of the peso-problem hypothesis.
Investors can use options to construct hedged versions of currency strategies that are
exposed to disaster risk. These hedged strategies put an upper bound on an investor’s
possible losses. Suppose a currency strategy involves going long (short) on foreign currency.
Then this strategy is exposed to large losses if there is a large depreciation (appreciation)
of the foreign currency. By buying a put (call) option on foreign currency the investor can
bound these losses. The payo! to a hedged strategy, zH





ht+1 if the option is in the money,
zt+1 ! ct(1 + it) if the option is out of the money.
The variables ct and it denote the cost of the put or call option and it denotes the nominal
interest rate. The variable ht+1 is the lower bound on the investor’s net payo!.






N(h)=0 .( 2 0 )
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Motivated by our previous results we assume that covN(M,z)=c o v N(M,zH)=0 .T h e n






.( 2 2 )
19Using equations (18) and (20) we can derive two expressions for ) & pM"/(1 ! p) that are







Here, we estimate ) because the parameters p and M" are not separately identiﬁed by the
pricing equations.
We estimate z" and ) for the carry trade using currency option data from J.P. Morgan for
ten major currencies over the period 1995—2009. As in Burnside et al. (2011), we assume that
in the disaster state all of the individual currency carry trades lose money. Consequently,
we assume that the investor hedges the equally-weighted carry trade strategy by buying
at-the-money options. This assumption means that the payo! of the carry trade portfolio in
the peso state is the average of the minimum payo!so ft h ei n d i v i d u a lc a r r yt r a d e si nt h a t
state.
The momentum strategy for an individual currency sometimes takes the opposite position
of the carry trade strategy. In these instances, if we assume carry is exposed to disaster
risk, momentum is naturally hedged against it. This property presents a di"culty for our
empirical strategy because it means that the unhedged momentum payo! for an individual
currency in the disaster state is occasionally !z",r a t h e rt h a nz".
To bring momentum into our analysis, we consider a 50-50 portfolio that equally combines
the carry trade and momentum portfolios. Suppose each of these portfolios is formed with n
currencies. When the two underlying strategies agree on the sign of an individual currency
trade, the net position in the portfolio for that currency is ±1/n.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ep o s i t i o ni s
naturally exposed to disaster risk, and this risk can be hedged using options. When the two
underlying strategies disagree on the sign of an individual currency trade, the net position
for that currency is zero.
Using data on the payo!st ot h eh e d g e da n du n h e d g e dc a r r yt r a d ea n d5 0 - 5 0c a r r y -
momentum strategies, and data on the minimum payo!st ot h eh e d g e ds t r a t e g i e s ,w ee s t i m a t e
the moments that appear on the right hand sides of equations (22) and (23). Doing so
20provides us with estimates of z"
1 (the payo! to the equally-weighted carry trade in the disaster
state) and z"
2 (the payo! to the 50-50 strategy in the disaster state), and two estimates of ).
Using a Wald test, we can test whether the two estimates of ) are equal, which they should
be, in absence of market segmentation.12 Alternatively, we can use the pricing equations of
the hedged and unhedged versions of the two strategies to estimate the three parameters, z"
1
and z"
2 and ) using GMM. This system is overidentiﬁed, and, therefore, provides us with a
simple test of the peso problem hypothesis.
When we use the ﬁrst procedure, our estimates are z"
1 = !0.037 (0.014), z"
2 = !0.019
(0.006). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Our two estimates of ) are 0.095
(0.059)a n d0.159 (0.091). The two estimates of ) are insigniﬁcantly di!erent from each other
according to the Wald test (p-value =0 .23). Given the small standard errors associated with
z"
1 and z"
2,w ec a nb eq u i t ec o n ﬁ d e n tt h a tt h ed i s a s t e re v e n ti sn o tc h a r a c t e r i z e db yl a r g e
losses to either the carry trade or the 50-50 carry-momentum portfolio.
When we use the second procedure, our estimates of z"
1 and z"
2 are !0.040 (0.020)a n d
!0.027 (0.015), and our estimate of ) is 0.089 (0.064). The test of the overidentifying
restrictions does not reject the model (p-value =0 .27). A value of ) of 0.089 means that if
we assume that the true probability of a rare event is p =0 .0014,t h e nM" " = 63.
Our analysis assumes that the SDF takes on a single value in the rare disaster or peso
state. Under alternative assumptions, we can still generate testable implications of the peso
problem hypothesis. For example, Burnside et al. (2011) show how to estimate a lower
bound for ED(z1) allowing for negative covariance between payo!st ot h ec a r r yt r a d ea n d
the SDF in the peso state.
Overall, we ﬁnd little evidence against the peso event hypothesis. According to our point
estimates, the peso event is not characterized by large losses to the currency strategies.
Instead, it is characterized by moderate losses and large values of the SDF.
12Burnside et al. (2011) discuss a related comparison of the values of M! implied by the carry trade and
ah e d g e ds t o c km a r k e ts t r a t e g y .
215P r i c e p r e s s u r e
In this section we discuss an alternative explanation for the proﬁtability of our currency
strategies raised in Burnside et al. (2006). This explanation relies on the existence of price
pressure in the foreign exchange market. By price pressure we mean that the price at which
investors can buy or sell an asset depends on the quantity they wish to transact. There is
as t r a n do fr e s e a r c hi nﬁ n a n c et h a ts t r e s s e st h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a td e m a n dc u r v e sf o ra s s e t s
are downward sloping. Shleifer (1986) and Mitchell & Pulvino (2004) present evidence in
support of this view for stocks.
Anecdotal evidence gathered from currency traders suggests that a similar phenomenon
occurs in foreign exchange markets: prices move against individual traders when they place
large orders. Here we present a simple model that illustrates the implications of price pressure
for the proﬁtability of currency-trading strategies.
The case of a single trader Consider an asset that has a value v+*,w h e r e* is a random
variable with mean zero. Suppose that there is a single risk-neutral trader who decides to
buy x units of the asset. To capture the basic e!ects of price pressure we suppose that the
price of the asset that the trader purchases depends on order size in the following way. The
price in the beginning of the day is:
p0 = a.( 2 4 )
As long as a<v ,i ti so p t i m a lf o rt h et r a d e rt ob u yap o s i t i v eq u a n t i t yo ft h ea s s e t .T r a d i n g
takes place during the course of a day. At instant t during the day the change in the price
depends on the quantity of orders, mt,s u b m i t t e da tt h a tp o i n ti nt i m e :
˙ pt = bmt.( 2 5 )
We assume that b is positive, so that the price is an increasing function of the quantity
purchased, i.e., there is price pressure.
Suppose the trader wants to buy x units of currency during the day. Consider the
22following two strategies. Strategy A is to submit an order for x,s a y ,a tt h ee n do ft h ed a y .
The price associated with the order is a+bx,s ot h a tt h et o t a lc o s to ft h eo r d e ri s :x(a + bx).
Strategy B is to break up the order and submit orders of size m = x/T throughout the
day. Here, T is the number of trading minutes in the day. The price of the asset at time t
is given by:
pt = a + b
+ t
0















It is clear that, from the perspective of the trader, strategy B dominates strategy A. So, we
assume that the trader uses strategy B and breaks up the orders. It is useful to re-write the
total cost of the order as:
, x
0 (a + bz)dz.
The trader’s proﬁt, +,i sg i v e nb y :
















The price paid for the last unit of the asset purchased is:
p
! = v.
We wish to stress two key features of this example. First, the expected proﬁt from the last
unit of the asset purchased by the trader is equal to zero. Second, the total expected proﬁts








23Consider an econometrician who observes the average trade during the day. He would cor-
rectly infer that the strategy is proﬁtable. Suppose that he ignores the existence of price
pressure and assumes that marginal and average proﬁts coincide. Then he would incorrectly
conclude that the trader is leaving money on the table by not expanding the size of the
trade.
The case of n traders Suppose that there is a ﬁxed number, n,o ft r a d e r s .W i t h i nt h e
day price pressure is governed by equations (24) and (25) where mt denotes total orders
arriving at time t.C o n s i d e raN a s he q u i l i b r i u mi nw h i c he a c ht r a d e rc h o o s e st ob u yx units
of the asset taking as given that the remaining n ! 1 traders buy ¯ x units each. The order
in which trades occur is randomly determined after traders choose x.T r a d e rj trades from
time T(j ! 1)/n to time Tj/n,w h e r et h ei n d e xj takes values from one to n.E a c ht r a d e r
breaks up his orders uniformly within his trading period. Since a representative trader has









The optimal value of x satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition:
v = a + bx +
1
2
b¯ x(n ! 1)




.( 2 6 )




b(1 + n)2 > 0.





(1 + n)2 [n +2 ( 1! j)].
24So, when n is large, roughly half of the traders make proﬁts and the other half make losses.
The proﬁts of the winners are larger than the losses of the losers, which is why average proﬁts
across traders are positive.
As in the single trader case, an econometrician who observes the average trade during
the day would conclude that the strategy is proﬁtable. He might wonder why traders don’t
increase their positions until this proﬁtability vanishes. But, while the average trade gener-
ates proﬁts, the marginal trade makes losses. So, there is no reason for traders to expand
their positions. No money is being left on the table.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We discuss two conventional explanations for the apparent proﬁtability of the carry trade
and momentum strategies. The ﬁrst is that investors are compensated for the risk they bear.
While this hypothesis is very appealing, we ﬁnd little evidence to support it. The second
conventional explanation is that the proﬁtability of the two currency strategies results from
ar a r ed i s a s t e ro rp e s op r o b l e m .W ea r g u et h a tt h er e c e n tﬁ n a n c i a lc r i s i si sn o tar a r ed i s a s t e r
from the standpoint of a currency speculator who uses both the carry trade and momentum
strategies. We also argue that the peso event is not characterized by large losses to currency
speculators. Instead, it features moderate losses and high values of the stochastic discount
factor.
Finally, we discuss the potential role of price pressure in explaining the proﬁtability
of the two currency strategies. While this approach shows some promise, two important
questions remain to be answered. First, is the form of price pressure postulated in our
example empirically plausible for currency markets? Second, what is the source of this price
pressure?
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(a) Model 1: DOL and HML
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(b) Model 2: DOL and VOL
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Table 1: Annualized excess returns of investment strategies (Feb. 1976-Dec. 2010) 
 
  Mean  SD  Sharpe   Skewness  Excess  Correlation with 
  (%)  (%)  Ratio    Kurtosis  Carry  Momentum 
               
Individual currency strategies (average)
a 
               
Carry trade  4.6  11.3  0.42  -0.23  1.6     
               
Momentum trade  4.9  11.3  0.43  -0.02  1.5     
               
Portfolio strategies
b 
               
Carry trade
c  4.6  5.1  0.89  -0.53  4.1  1.00  0.10 
  (0.9)  (0.4)  (0.21)  (0.40)  (1.5)     
               
Momentum
c  4.5  7.3  0.62  0.08  2.9  0.10  1.00 
  (1.2)  (0.5)  (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.9)     
               
50-50 strategy
d  4.5  4.6  0.98  0.36  2.5  0.63  0.84 
  (0.8)  (0.3)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.5)     
               
U.S. stocks
e  6.5  15.7  0.41  -0.78  2.3  0.09  -0.09 
  (2.8)  (1.0)  (0.19)  (0.28)  (1.1)     
               
 
aThe mean excess returns of the currency portfolios are not equal to the average mean 
excess returns of the respective individual-currency trades because the sample period 
varies by currency. 
bHeteroskedasticity-consistent GMM standard errors are in parentheses. 
cThe carry trade (momentum) portfolio is formed as the average of up to 20 individual 
currency carry (momentum) trades against the USD. 
dThe 50-50 strategy is an equally-weighted average of the carry and momentum 
portfolios. 
eThe U.S. stock market return is the value-weighted excess return on all U.S. stocks. ! "5 !
Table 2: Factor betas of the currency portfolios (1976-2010) 
  Carry Trade  Momentum 





                 
CAPM
b  0.029      0.01  -0.042      0.01 
  (0.017)        (0.036)       
                 
Fama-French
c  0.045*  -0.034  0.042  0.02  -0.037  -0.030  -0.001  0.01 
  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.029)    (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.047)   
                 
Quadratic CAPM
d  0.033  0.286    0.01  -0.027  1.202    0.02 
  (0.019)  (0.343)      (0.028)  (1.368)     
                 
CAPM-Volatility
e  -0.004  -0.010  2.093  0.02  -0.012  0.001  -1.885  0.01 
  (0.026)  (0.231)  (1.627)    (0.066)  (0.232)  (5.212)   
                 
C-CAPM
f  0.006      0.00  -0.583      0.00 
  (0.733)        (0.840)       
                 
Extended C-CAPM
g  -0.314  0.671  0.013  0.01  -0.176  -0.712  -0.070  0.04 
  (0.824)  (0.572)  (0.031)    (0.765)  (0.718)  (0.047)   
                 
 
aThe table reports estimates of the slope coefficients and the R
2 in a regression of the 
portfolio payoffs on a constant and the indicated risk factors. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Slope coefficients that are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level are indicated by an asterisk(
*). Payoffs are monthly 
nominal excess returns, and the sample period is Mar. 1976-Dec. 2010 unless otherwise 
indicated. 
bThe CAPM model uses a single factor, the excess return on the value-weighted US stock 
market (Mkt-Rf). 
cThe Fama-French model uses Mkt-Rf as well as Fama and French’s SMB and HML 
factors. 
dThe Quadratic CAPM uses Mkt-Rf and !(Mkt-Rf)
2 as factors. ! "6 !
eThe CAPM-Volatility model uses Mkt-Rf and stock volatility (the standard deviation of 
daily excess returns, measured monthly), and their interaction as factors.  
fThe C-CAPM model uses the log growth rate of real consumption of nondurables and 
services, and is estimated with quarterly real excess returns, 1976Q2-2010Q1. 
gThe extended C-CAPM model uses the C-CAPM factor, the log growth rate of the 
service flow of durables (assumed to be proportional to the real stock of consumer 
durables), and the market return (Mkt), as factors.  ! "7 !
Table 3: GMM estimates of linear factor models




b   R
2 c  J
d  Pricing Errors (%)
e 
Factor Model          Carry  Momentum 
             
CAPM  2.4
*  0.49
*  -1.50  106.00  4.4
*  4.7
* 
  (1.2)  (0.22)    (0.00)  (0.9)  (1.3) 
             
Fama-French             
  Mkt-Rf  3.5
*  0.53
*  0.38  92.73  4.2
*  4.8
* 
  (1.4)  (0.23)    (0.00)  (0.9)  (1.4) 
             
  SMB  3.2  0.24         
  (1.8)  (0.15)         
             
  HML  6.4
*  0.34
*         
  (1.9)  (0.17)         
             
Quadratic CAPM             
  Mkt-Rf  0.3  0.25  -3.72  99.38  4.6
*  5.0
* 
  (1.5)  (0.23)    (0.00)  (0.9)  (1.4) 
             
  !(Mkt-Rf)
2   -70.8  -0.03         
  (74.7)  (0.03)         
             
CAPM-Volatility             
  Mkt-Rf  -5.7  0.04  -7.37  90.80  4.2
*  4.8
* 
  (4.9)  (0.24)    (0.00)  (0.9)  (1.7) 
             
  Stock volatility  -16.7  -0.09         
  (42.4)  (0.09)         
             
  Mkt-Rf ! Stock vol.  325.5  0.01         
          (406.7)  (0.01)         
             
 
*Test assets are the Fama-French 25 portfolios, and the equally-weighted carry trade and 
currency momentum portfolios. See Table 2 for the definitions of risk factors. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except as noted. An 
asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
a b is the parameter vector in the SDF, m = 1 – (f – µ)"b.  ! "8 !
b ! is the vector of risk premia associated with the factors. 
c R
2 is a measure of fit between the sample average and model-predicted mean returns.  
d J is the test statistic for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
e Annualized %.! 39 !
 






b   R
2 c  J
d  Pricing Errors (%)
e 
Factor Model          Carry  Momentum 
             
C-CAPM  -15.2  -0.03  -10.00  72.02  4.7
*  4.6
* 
  (43.7)  (0.08)    (0.00)  (1.0)  (1.3) 
             
Extended C-CAPM             
   !ln(consumption)  -17.0  -0.03  -0.70  61.77  4.7
*  5.3
* 
  (50.4)  (0.08)    (0.00)  (1.0)  (1.4) 
!            
   !ln(durables)  -15.5  -0.06         
  (36.1)  (0.08)         
!            
   Mkt 
2.8
*     1.90*    
       
  (1.2)  (0.72)         
             
 
*Test assets are the Fama-French 25 portfolios, and the equally-weighted carry trade and 
currency momentum portfolios. See Table 2 for the definitions of risk factors. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except as noted. An 
asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
a b is the parameter vector in the SDF, m = 1 – (f – µ)"b.  
b ! is the vector of risk premia associated with the factors. 
c R
2 is a measure of fit between the sample average and model-predicted mean returns.  
d J is the test statistic for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
e Annualized %. ! "0 !
Table 5: Factor betas of the sorted, carry, and momentum portfolios 
 
    Betas
a 
  Mean 
Return  Model 1  Model 2 
Portfolio







               
S1  -0.7  1.03
*   -0.48
*  0.93  1.01
*   2.1
*  0.75 
  (1.9)  (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.04)  (0.5)   
               
S2  -0.3  0.95
*  -0.12
*   0.85  0.94
*   -0.1  0.83 
  (1.7)  (0.03)  (0.02)    (0.03)  (0.5)   
               
S3  2.8  0.98
*  -0.00  0.83  0.97
*   -0.4  0.83 
  (1.8)  (0.03)  (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.3)   
               
S4  3.6  1.02
*  0.08
*  0.86  1.02
*   -0.5  0.86 
  (1.8)  (0.03)  (0.02)    (0.03)  (0.3)   
               
S5  5.3  1.03
*   0.52
*  0.94  1.06
*   -1.3
*   0.73 
  (2.1)  (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.04)  (0.5)   
               
Carry  4.6  0.20
*   0.26
*  0.38  0.21
*   -0.8
*   0.15 
  (0.9)  (0.04)  (0.03)    (0.05)  (0.4)   
               
Momentum  4.5  0.03  -0.10  0.02  0.02  0.1  0.00 
  (1.2)  (0.08)  (0.06)    (0.08)  (1.0)   
               
 
aThe table reports estimates of the slope coefficients and the R
2 in a regression of the 
portfolio payoffs on a constant and the indicated risk factors. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Slope coefficients that are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level are indicated by an asterisk(
*). Payoffs are monthly 
nominal excess returns, and the sample period is Mar. 1976-Dec. 2010. 
bThe portfolios are five portfolios of long positions in foreign currency sorted in 
increasing order by the forward discount (S1–S5), the carry trade portfolio and the 
momentum portfolio. 
cThe DOL factor is the average excess return to portfolios S1–S5. ! "1 !
dThe HMLFX factor is the excess return to being long portfolio S5 and short portfolio S1. 
eThe VOL factor is a measure of realized global currency volatility. ! "2 !
Table 6: GMM estimates of currency-factor-based models




b   R
2 c  J
d  Pricing Errors (%)
e 
Factor Model         S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  Mom.
f 
                     
Model 1                     
  DOL  3.7  0.25   -0.04  18.90  -0.5  -2.4   -0.1  0.0  -1.3   5.1 
  (2.2)  (0.12)    (0.00)  (0.5)  (0.7)  (0.9)  (0.7)  (0.5)  (1.4) 
                     
  HMLFX   7.4   0.57                  
  (2.1)  (0.13)                 
                     
Model 2                     
  DOL  0.3  0.17  0.04  6.51  1.8  -2.4   0.0  0.5  0.6  4.6 
  (3.4)  (0.16)    (0.16)  (1.0)  (1.1)  (2.4)  (2.1)  (3.1)  (2.9) 
                     
  VOL  -3.9   -17.93                  
  (1.6)  (6.73)                 
                     
 
*Test assets are five portfolios of long positions in foreign currency sorted in increasing 
order by the forward discount (S1–S5), and the momentum portfolio. See Table 5 for the 
definitions of risk factors. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses, except as noted. An asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5 
percent level. 
a b is the parameter vector in the SDF, m = 1 – (f – µ)!b.  
b ! is the vector of risk premia associated with the factors. 
c R
2 is a measure of fit between the sample average and model-predicted mean returns.  
d J is the test statistic for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
e Annualized % 
f Momentum 